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Will Covid-19 change
attitudes towards the
welfare state?
John Curtice
How the public might swing in favour of improved welfare
provision for those of working age
Britain’s welfare state has suddenly been presented with a newchallenge – to keep the country afloat during the Covid-19pandemic. The most immediate pressure is on the health service,
whose ability to cope with the numbers needing hospital care is now
imposing a constraint on the country’s economic activity. But, after
successive years of reining back the scale of welfare provision to those of
working age, the government is now also providing – via the social security
system – increased levels of support to those who have lost their incomes,
as well as subsidising on an unprecedented scale the salaries of those
in work.
“Britain’s welfare state has suddenly been
presented with a new challenge – to keep
the country afloat during the Covid-19
pandemic”
An obvious question that arises is whether and how this experience will
change public attitudes towards the two arms of the welfare state: the
provision of public services, such as the health service and social care; and
the distribution of transfer payments to those on low incomes. Maybe
voters will draw the conclusion that the Covid-19 experience has
uncovered a country that lacks the resilience needed to cope with
misfortune and be willing to support more generous welfare provision. Or
perhaps they will prefer to forget what might prove to be a temporary
interruption to the regular rhythms of economic life, and look for a return
to the status quo ante.
This article assesses the possible implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for
public attitudes towards the welfare state. It does so by addressing two
questions.
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• First, do the actions taken by the government to expand the welfare state
run with the grain of public opinion, or do they represent a marked
departure from what the public has hitherto been seeking? After all, the
less those actions run contrary to the current public mood, the greater
the likelihood they will be accepted in the short term and become
embedded in the longer term.
• Second, in so far as attitudes to welfare have changed in the past, what
lessons can we learn that might be relevant to how public attitudes
might be affected and influenced in the longer term?
EVIDENCE
The evidence used here comes from the British Social Attitudes survey
(BSA). This is a high-quality survey that has been conducted annually since
1983 by NatCen Social Research.1 The survey is undertaken face to face
with a random sample of the adult population across Great Britain.
Throughout the 35 years from the first survey in 1983 to the most recent
one in 2018, BSA has repeatedly asked questions about various aspects of
the welfare state, including most notably the health service and various
forms of social security. It thus provides us with unique insight into how
public attitudes towards the welfare state have ebbed and flowed during the
past four decades.
PUBLIC SERVICES
As already indicated, the term ‘welfare state’ is usually taken to encompass
two different aspects of government activity: the provision of public services
and the delivery of transfer payments. The provision of public services can
be further divided into: services such as education and childcare, which are
primarily intended to open up opportunities for parents and their children
to enhance themselves and their productive potential; and the health service
and social care, which are primarily aimed at those in need and thus are the
parts of the welfare state on which we rely in times of difficulty.
Spending on the health service has always been popular. Every year, BSA
has presented its respondents with a list of possible items of government
spending, and asked them which one would be their first priority. Health
1 Curtice J, Clery E, Perry J, Phillips M and Rahim N (eds) (2019) British Social Attitudes 36,
NatCen Social Research. https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-36/
key-findings.aspx
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has always been the most popular choice – on average running at 50 per
cent across the whole period between 1983 and 2018. To that extent, at
least, there has always been a widespread appetite for more. Meanwhile,
there has never been much support for the idea of limiting the health
service to those with lower incomes, rather than running it as a universal
service. At 23 per cent, the most recently recorded level of support for that
idea (in 2018) is in line with what it has been throughout the past 20 years
(when it has averaged 25 per cent).
However, the popularity of more health spending has varied somewhat
over time – for example, whereas in 1983 just 37 per cent picked out
health as their first priority, by 1989 the figure had risen to 61 per cent.
Meanwhile, more recently, health has once again been rising in the public’s
list of priorities. In 2011, 40 per cent felt more spending on health was the
top priority. But in the most recent survey, in 2018, the figure had risen to
56 per cent – second only to the 61 per cent figure recorded in 1989. In
other words, even though spending on health was protected – relatively at
least – during the years of austerity following the financial crash of
2008/09, the public seems to have become increasingly concerned to see
yet more spending on the NHS. Even among Conservative supporters, as
many as 52 per cent say that more health spending is their top priority,
only a little less than the 63 per cent of Labour identifiers who hold that
view. In part, at least, the increased prioritisation of health spending
appears to reflect growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the
health service.2 Back in 2010, as many as 70 per cent said that they were
‘very’ or ‘quite’ satisfied with the way that ‘the National Health Service
runs nowadays’. By 2018, the figure had slipped to 53 per cent, although
this is still above any figure recorded between 1984 and 2007.
“even though spending on health was
protected – relatively at least – during the
years of austerity following the financial crash
of 2008/09, the public seems to have become
increasingly concerned to see yet more
spending on the NHS”
2 Robertson R, Appleby J, Hemmings N and Evans H (2019) Public Satisfaction with the NHS
and Social Care in 2018, The King’s Fund. https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/public-
satisfaction-nhs-social-care-2018
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As compared with the health service, social care has long seemed to be a
Cinderella service – not least because the provision made by the state is far
from universal. Indeed, this position reflects the balance of public opinion.
In 2018, only 44 per cent told BSA that the government should pay for
social care, whereas 54 per cent said that government should only pay after
the individual had contributed what they could, albeit maybe only up to a
capped limit. Meanwhile, although only 26 per cent said they were satisfied
with the social care provided by local authorities, only around a third
(34 per cent) said they were actually dissatisfied. As many as three in
10 (31 per cent) said that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, while
9 per cent said they didn’t know. At any particular point in time, many
fewer people are in contact with social care services than with the NHS –
and this may well mean that fewer people have a firm view on the quality
of social care provision. Thus, although the Covid-19 pandemic has
underlined the vulnerability of older people who need care, it has done so
against the backdrop of a mood that does not seem to provide much
impetus for an enhancement of what the state currently provides in terms
of social care.
TRANSFER PAYMENTS
If the health service has consistently been at the top of people’s
spending priorities, spending on social security has regularly been at the
bottom of the ladder of priorities. In the 35 years that BSA has asked
its question about spending priorities, the proportion saying that more
social security spending was their top choice has never been more than
7 per cent – and has not been higher than the current level of 2 per
cent since Tony Blair first entered Downing Street in 1997. The
transfer payment part of the welfare state is seemingly much less highly
regarded.
“If the health service has consistently been at
the top of people’s spending priorities,
spending on social security has regularly been
at the bottom of the ladder of priorities”
Yet, as in the case of public services, there are some important distinctions
to be made. One is between pensioners and the rest of the population.
Over half of social security spending goes to pensioners. And that
proportion has increased somewhat in recent years, as the government has
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sought to curb benefits for the working-age population while keeping in
place the relatively generous formula that determines the annual uprate in
the level of the state pension.3 It is, however, sections of the working-age
population, and not pensioners, whose incomes have been primarily
affected by the coronavirus pandemic.
The focus on spending on pensioners reflected what until recently appeared to
be the public mood. As well as asking people their priorities for public
spending in general, BSA has also regularly invited people to state what was
their top priority for more spending on ‘social benefits’. Until very recently,
spending on old-age pensions was the single most popular choice. Between
1983 and 1995, the relevant proportion hovered around an average of 43 per
cent. But between 2000 and 2010, the figure never fell below a half (averaging
56 per cent) – though by 2014 it had returned to 44 per cent. Otherwise, the
public’s empathy appeared to be focussed on disabled people (on average
between 1983 and 2014, 23 per cent picked benefits for this group) and
children (14 per cent). In contrast, benefits for unemployed people, which were
selected on average by 16 per cent during the 1980s (when unemployment was
relatively high), fell sharply down people’s list of priorities during New Labour’s
time in office, with just 4 per cent regarding them as their top priority.
However, support for prioritising pensioners now seems to have waned,
such that it is no longer clearly the single most popular choice for
spending. In the 2018 BSA, the 32 per cent who selected retirement
pensions was matched for the first time by the 33 per cent who chose
benefits for disabled people. Meanwhile, some of the decline in support for
more spending on benefits for unemployed people has been reversed, with
7 per cent now picking this option. It appears as though the public may
have noticed the relatively favourable position enjoyed by pensioners in
recent years – and switched their priorities accordingly.
“support for prioritising pensioners now seems
to have waned, such that it is no longer clearly
the single most popular choice for spending”
3 Gardiner L (2019) The Shifting Shape of Social Security, Resolution Foundation. https://www.
resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2019/11/The-shifting-shape-of-social-security.pdf;
Office for Budget Responsibility (2018) An OBR Guide to Welfare Spending, https://obr.uk/
forecasts-in-depth/brief-guides-and-explainers/an-obr-guide-to-welfare-spending
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These figures, however, simply give us an indication of the relative
priority that the public gives to different social security benefits. Given
that benefits for unemployed people have never been particularly
popular, there is a risk that any change in attitude towards such benefits
may fail to reveal itself in the responses to a question about the top
priority for more spending. However, in some years, BSA respondents
have been asked whether spending on benefits for unemployed people
should be increased, reduced or stay the same, while also being asked
separately what they think should happen to spending on benefits for
retired people (see table 1).
The top half of table 1 confirms that, while still relatively popular, support for
more spending on benefits for retired people fell markedly during the period
from 1998 to 2017. As recently as 2008, there was still a near consensus on the
desirability of more spending on benefits for retired people, with 72 per cent
backing the idea. More recently, the figure has fallen to below a half. More
importantly, however, the second half of the table shows that there has been a
marked change in attitudes towards benefits for unemployed people. Between
1998 and 2008, there was a marked increase – from just over a third (35 per
cent) to over a half (54 per cent) – in the proportion who believed that
spending on benefits for unemployed people should be reduced. More recently,
however, that increase has been almost wholly reversed.
However, the apparent change in attitudes towards benefits for
unemployed people is even clearer in table 2, which shows how people
have responded when in every year of the BSA survey they have been
asked whether benefits for unemployed people are too low and cause
hardship or are too high and discourage people from finding a job.
When the Conservatives were in power in the 1980s and 1990s, the
predominant view was that benefits were too low, with typically around
half of people expressing that view. But as soon as New Labour took
over the reins of office in 1997, the balance of opinion soon tilted in
the opposite direction – and remained that way until our most recent
survey, when those who thought that payments were too high (39 per
cent) now only slightly outnumbered the proportion who felt they were
too low (35 per cent).
In part, these changes in attitudes towards benefits for unemployed people
could be said to reflect trends in the level of unemployment– and that
people were more generous in their attitudes towards benefits for
unemployed people in the 1980s, when unemployment was high, than
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they were in the first two decades of the 21st century when
unemployment was relatively low (and largely remained so despite the
financial crash).4 However, the sharpness and suddenness of the change
in the balance of opinion following the change of government in 1997
suggest that this is not a sufficient explanation. Indeed, it has previously
been demonstrated that the change of attitude occurred most heavily
among those who identified as Labour supporters – a pattern that
suggested the advent of a Labour government that, in contrast to the
party’s traditional outlook, was keen to reduce the welfare bill (and more
broadly was seemingly less concerned about inequality) had a particular
impact on the views of those who supported the party.5 This suggests
that how parties position themselves on welfare can influence public
attitudes.
Table 1. Attitudes towards spending on (a) benefits for retired people and (b) benefits for
unemployed people, 1998–2017
Benefits for
retired people 1998 1999 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2013 2017
% % % % % % % % %
Spend more 71 70 73 73 72 72 57 48 47
Same as now 24 25 23 23 24 24 37 42 42
Spend less 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 7 8
Benefits for
unemployed
people 1998 1999 2002 2004 2006 2008 2011 2013 2017
% % % % % % % % %
Spend more 22 24 21 15 16 14 15 15 20
Same as now 40 41 39 39 36 29 32 35 41
Spend less 35 32 36 44 45 54 51 49 37
Source: British Social Attitudes survey
4 Office for National Statistics (2020) ‘Time series related to unemployment’. https://www.ons.
gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment#timeseries
5 Curtice J (2010) ‘Thermostat or weathervane? Public reactions to spending and redistribution
under New Labour’ in Park A, Curtice J, Thomson K, Phillips M, Clery E and Butt S (eds)
British Social Attitudes: The 26th report, Sage.
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“the advent of a Labour government that, in
contrast to the party’s traditional outlook, was
keen to reduce the welfare bill (and more
broadly was seemingly less concerned about
inequality) had a particular impact on the
views of those who supported the party”
A similar dynamic now seems to be in evidence, albeit in reverse. The level
of unemployment was still slowly falling between 2017 and 2018, in line
with the trend for the previous half a dozen years or so. Voters cannot
therefore be said to have been reacting to a spike in unemployment.
Meanwhile, as table 3 shows, the change in the balance of attitudes towards
whether benefits for unemployed people are too high or too low has been
particularly marked among those who support Labour. Compared with
10 years ago, there has been a 23-percentage-point increase in the
proportion of Labour supporters who say that benefits for unemployed
people are too low, whereas the increase among supporters of other parties
or of none has been of the order of just six to eight percentage points.
Labour’s stance in recent years has, of course, been very different from the
era of New Labour. The party has engaged in repeated criticism of the
Conservative government’s programme of ‘austerity’, including its
reductions in welfare support for those of working age. It has also criticised
the implementation of the new universal credit system. If those criticisms
have proven persuasive, we would expect them to be especially so among
Labour supporters – and this indeed is what seems to have happened.
Table 3. Attitudes towards benefits for unemployed people by party identification, 2008,
2017 and 2018
2008 2017 2018 2008–18
Benefits for
unemployed
people
Too
low
Too
high
Too
low
Too
high
Too
low
Too
high
Too
low
Too
high
Party
identification
% % % % % % Change in %
Conservative 12 73 12 67 19 55 +7 -18
Labour 28 54 36 41 51 27 +23 -27
Liberal Democrat 30 53 43 31 38 27 +8 -26
None 22 58 26 49 28 40 +6 -18
Source: British Social Attitudes survey
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Moreover, this trend fits a wider pattern of research evidence, again based
on BSA data, which suggests that an increased concern among voters about
poverty in recent years has been particularly in evidence among Labour
supporters.6
IMPLICATIONS
A few years ago, a sudden increase in welfare provision to those of working
age would have truly cut across the grain of public opinion. But, as it
happens, the past few years have witnessed something of a change in public
attitudes towards aspects of the welfare state. Although the provision of
benefits for retired people remains relatively popular, voters now seem to
be rather more sympathetic to the position of those of working age who
find themselves in need. That may make it more likely that the public will
accept the cost – in terms of taxation and/or borrowing – that will be
occasioned by the government’s attempt to provide relief for workers
during the coronavirus public health crisis. Meanwhile, it seems unlikely
that there will be much opposition to the inevitable increase in health
service spending that will be occasioned by Covid-19 in the short run at
least, though whether it will help bring about a change in the funding of
social care is less clear.
But the more interesting question, of course, is whether the experience of
the Covid-19 pandemic will have a longer-term impact on attitudes
towards the welfare state. Might we see a further reversal of the critical
attitude towards benefits for those of working age that was until recently
clearly in evidence? Might there be an expectation that the health service
should be made more resilient by running with more (but costly) spare
capacity? And might such a change of outlook prove advantageous to
Labour as the party that is most strongly associated with the welfare state?
Perhaps. But the crucial lesson of 35 years of BSA data is that politics
matters. Voters followed Labour’s lead in becoming more critical of welfare
at the turn of the century, and now appear to have swung back again
somewhat in the wake of the party’s attacks on austerity. That suggests that
an opportunity will indeed open up for the party to create a narrative that
6 Clery E and Dangerfield P (2019) ‘Poverty and inequality: have attitudes moved in line with
official trends or political and media discourse?’ in Curtice J, Clery E, Perry J, Phillips M and
Rahim N (eds) British Social Attitudes 36, NatCen Social Research. https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.
uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-36/poverty-and-inequality.aspx
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persuades voters that it should be given the task of running an enhanced
welfare state in post-Covid-19 Britain. But it also means that, even though
it might currently find itself in an unfamiliar policy position in expanding
the welfare state, it is also open to the Conservative party to develop and
secure support for its story as to how the welfare state should be run in
future. After all, this was already a Conservative government that was
inclined to be more interventionist than the governments of Thatcher,
Major and Cameron ever were – and perhaps it might yet prove capable of
framing and matching a more interventionist public mood on welfare once
the pandemic is over.
John Curtice is a professor of politics at Strathclyde University, and
senior research fellow at NatCen Social Research and the UK in a
Changing Europe.
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